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Consensus formation:
The case of using cell phones while driving
Bertrand M. Roehner 1
Institute for Theoretical and High Energy Physics
University Paris 7
Abstract Several models (including the widely used Sznajd model) have been proposed in order to
describe the social phenomenon of consensus formation. The objective of the present paper is to sup-
plement the simulations based on these models with a “real world simulation”; it considers a situation
which can be considered as an ideal laboratory for analyzing consensus formation, namely the autho-
rization or prohibition of using cell phones while driving. This is a convenient laboratory for several
reasons (i) The issue was raised in similar terms in all industrialized countries, a circumstance that
facilitates comparative analysis by providing a set of observations (as opposed to single observations
generated, for instance, in election contests). (ii) This is a situation where we happen to know the rule
a “rational” agent should follow. (iii) Because the issue is a matter of life and death, the phenomenon
can be considered as fairly robust with respect to various, endogenous or exogenous, sources of noise.
(iv) The relevant data are available on the Internet and in newspaper data bases.
Our observations strongly suggest that there is a missing variable in most consensus formation sim-
ulations. In its conclusion, the paper calls for a large scale effort for identifying, documenting and
analyzing other real-world cases of consensus formation.
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1 Introduction
In recent years the questions of information diffusion and consensus formation were studied by many
authors. Among the landmark papers let us mention Kacperski et al. (1996), Sznajd-Weron et al.
(2000), Stauffer et al. (2000), Stauffer (2001, 2003), Ball (2003), Behera et al. (2003). The last
paper provides a clear comprehensive overall view of the applications of cellular automata in voting
and consensus formation problems. This paper differs from the rich sample of simulations already
proposed in the sense that it is what can be called a “real world simulation”. Naturally, the data in
table 2 (below) don’t have the precision of simulated data, but the trend that they illustrate is suffi-
ciently different from what simulations based on the Sznajd model predict to foster further reflection.
In a nutshell, the paper’s main message is that socio-political macro-factors may, to a considerable
degree, distort the standard pattern of consensus formation, either by restraining or by amplifying
the diffusion of information. We use the expression “macro-factors” because usually they concern a
whole community, region or country. Although this paper focuses on a specific case-study, namely the
question of using a mobile phone while driving, there is good evidence that the existence of macro-
factors is the rule rather than the exception (see the concluding section). Naturally, it would not be
difficult to insert macro constraints into a one- or two-dimensional lattice simulation (they could be
seen as additional external fields). The problem is rather that through the introduction of an extra set
of unknown parameters the comparison between the model and the real world would lose much of its
relevance, at least unless these parameters can be estimated a priori. In short, this problem calls for
developing a reliable methodology for estimating macro constraints. This may not be an easy task,
however.
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section provides experimental and observational evidence
about the risk of using a cell phone while driving. The third section examines how this information
spread among industrialized countries. It reveals great differences: in some countries the process
took one or two years, in others it took over ten years. In the latter cases, obviously the propagation
of information was hindered and restrained by some powerful constraints. These constraints were
able to block transmission through formal mass media channels as well as through informal channels
(rumors, hearsay, gossip). In the conclusion, we briefly address the question of the origin and strength
of those macro-constraints.
Before getting started it should be emphasized that what makes this comparative study possible is the
fact that the phenomenon that we consider takes comparable forms in different countries. Cell phones,
cars, the reactions of drivers to disturbances, roads, traffic rules, or mass-media channels are fairly
similar in all industrialized countries. It is this uniformity and homogeneity, that makes cross-national
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comparisons meaningful1.
2 The evidence
In the Wall Street Journal of July 19, 2004 we read that wireless companies “point out to research
that could bolster the notion that use by drivers is not a big problem”. Similarly, RER Wireless News
of May 2002 observes that “we are still in the information collecting stage”. The last statement may
appear surprising if one recalls that cell phones have been in use at least since 1995 and that radio
telephones have been used in cars for much longer. As a matter of fact, as shown in table 1, the
question has been actively investigated by academic researchers and safety agencies, leading to fairly
clear and irrefutable evidence.
One of the most unquestionable observations was made in Japan. The ban on using hand-held cell
phones while driving was imposed in November 1999. In the 6 months before enforcement there were
1,473 traffic accidents connected with drivers using mobile phones, whereas in the 6 months after the
ban there were only 580 which represents a 61% drop (ROSPA p. 18).
The other conclusions which emerge from table 1 are the following.
• The risk of accident is multiplied by a factor of the order of 4 to 5 when a cell phone is used
while driving.
• Hands-free phones offer no benefit. A study by researchers at the university of Toronto and
published in the New England Journal of Medicine (February 1997) authorized a comparison between
hand-held phones and hands-free phones. The risk was found to be 4 times higher for the first device
and 6 times higher for the second. This result could seem fairly counter-intuitive but becomes more
understandable when one realizes that people with hands-free phones tend to make longer calls than
people with hand-held phones and all studies have shown that it not the fact of holding the wheel
with only one hand which is dangerous but rather the fact that the driver’s attention is captured by the
conversation. In short, hands-free phones do not provide any benefit in terms of safety.
• A study published in early 2004 by the Harvard Center of Risk Analysis estimated that drivers
talking on cell phones are responsible for about 6% of all US auto accidents each year. This represents
2,600 people killed (i.e. 10 fatalities per million of population) and 330,000 injured (Sundeen 2004,
p. 3).
1Naturally, there are also factors which are not identical. This, in itself, is not an obstacle to cross-national comparisons
however. A physical parallel may help to explain why. When the Foucault pendulum experiment is performed for instance
in Stockholm and in Rome, the pendulums which are used are certainly not identical; their lengths, masses, the nature
of their suspensions may not be the same, but this does not prevent the comparison of the observations to be significant
because it is known (from former pendulum experiments) that these factors do not critically affect the phenomenon under
consideration; whatever influence they may have, it will be at least one order of magnitude smaller than the error bars of
the main observation and can therefore be ignored.
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Table 1 Risk involved in using cell phones while driving
Year Country Main conclusions
1 1995 France Reaction time 60% slower
2 1997 Canada Risk of accident multiplied by 4 to 5; hands-free phones offer no benefit
3 1999 Japan • In the 6 months before the ban there were 1,473 cell phone related
accidents; in the 6 months after the ban there were 580
• In the 12 months before the ban there were 2,830 cell phone related
accidents; in the 12 months after the ban there were 1,391
4 2000 UK Fourfold risk during (and up to 5 mn after) cell phone calls
5 2001 US (Utah) Phone conversations create distractions levels much higher than other
activities such as radio, talking with passengers, etc.
6 2004 US (Harvard) Cell phone related accidents kill each year 2,600 people in the
United States (330,000 injured)
7 2004 Sweden No significant difference between hand-held and hands-free phones
Notes: The country(third column) is where the study was carried out. Although in a general way the data
published by US statistical agencies are at top level in terms of coverage and availability, for this particular
problem American publications lagged behind those of other industrialized countries. It should be noted that
Japan was one of the few countries where police reports gave indications about cell phone use in accidents; in
most other countries this information is not recorded.
Sources: 1: Le Monde (29 Dec. 1995); 2: New England Journal of Medicine (February 1997) cited in Le
Figaro (13 Feb. 1997); 3: Edmonton Sun (Alberta, Canada, 27 Feb. 2004); 4: The Independent (6 May 2000),
Daily Telegraph (4 Oct. 2003); 5: Daily Mail (30 Jan. 2003); 6: Edmonton Sun (Alberta, Canada, 27 Feb.
2004); http://www.ncsl.org; 7: International Herald Tribune (12 Apr. 2004).
In order to realize that the previous data are consistent with one another and to make them fit with
intuition, one should add a few explanations. The main question is how the fourfold ratio which was
observed in the Canadian study can be consistent with the twofold decrease in the number of accidents
that what recorded in Japan?
1) First, one should note that only hand-held phones were prohibited in Japan; if all kinds of
phones had been prohibited a sharper decrease would likely have been observed.
2) Secondly, if (as claimed by the Toronto study) hands-free phones are not safer than hand-
held phones one may wonder how the decrease observed in Japan should be accounted for. The
explanation is certainly that back in 1999 only few drivers had got hands-free sets which means that
the vast majority had to stop using their phones altogether until having been able to buy hands-free
sets. If this interpretation is correct one would expect the number of accidents to increase in the course
of time as more and more drivers are able to use hands-free phones. This is indeed confirmed by the
fact that in the second of the 6-month interval after the interdiction, the reduction in the number of
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accidents was smaller than over the first 6-month interval: it fell from 61% to 43%. (Edmonton Sun,
Alberta, Canada February 27, 2004). In other words, the benefits of the ban in terms of safety eroded
in the course of time.
3) From a practical and intuitive point of view one may wonder why conversations on the phone
are more distracting than conversations with passengers. There are two reasons for that. (i) Passengers
spontaneously stop talking when the driver faces a difficult situation, for instance during a tricky
overtaking. (ii) There is evidence that phone conversations have a high emotional content. After all,
as cell phone call are fairly expensive, people usually make a call in order to say something important.
An observation which support this assertion is the fact that the risk remains significantly higher over a
time interval of at least 15 minutes after the end of the conversation. In short, cell phone conversations
indeed seem to have a higher emotional content than conversations with passengers.
In the next section we analyze to what extent the information summarized in table 1 was disseminated
in various countries.
3 Information dissemination and consensus formation
The dissemination of information by medias, road safety agencies, automobile clubs, etc. can be stud-
ied in two different ways. (i) By trying to assess the content of newspaper articles, agency reports, etc.
(ii) By examining the legislation which was enacted to cope with the problem. The first methodology
is difficult to implement, not only because of the great number of publications, but also because it
is not easy to assess their content in an objective and quantitative way. In the second approach, one
considers only the outcome in terms of new legislation; this is a kind of back box approach in which
the input is the evidence presented in table 1 and the output the legislation summarized in table 2.
Although much of this paper relies on this black box approach, in the appendix we also summarize
some of the articles to get a more concrete feeling.
As one knows, the Sznajd model always leads to complete consensus. On account of the evidence
presented in table 1, the only “rational” consensus would be to forbid the use of cell phones in cars,
whether hand-hold or hands-free. This would safe at least 5,000 lives annually in North America and
Europe and a much larger number in coming years as cell phones and cars become more common in
countries with large populations such as China, India and Indonesia. However, as shown in table 2, not
a single country has banned hands-free phones. This suggest that, although available, the information
pertaining to the risk of hand-free phones has been little circulated. In contrast, the information about
the risk of hand-held phones was disseminated in many countries but with great differences in the
delay required for consensus formation.
A missing variable In the Sznajd model each person holds one of several opinions and attempts
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Table 2 Ban on cell phone use while driving: cross-national comparison
Country Year Month
1 Austria 2002
2 Canada No ban
3 Denmark 1998 July
4 Finland 2003 January
5 France 2003 April
6 Germany 2001 February
7 Italy 2003 July
8 Japan 1999 November
9 South Korea 2001 July
10 Spain 2002
11 Sweden No ban
12 UK 2003 December
13 US No ban
Notes: The bans concern hand-held phones only; so far no country has banned hands-free phones in spite of
reliable evidence showing that using them is no less dangerous. “No ban” means that (as of July 2004) there
has been no nationwide ban. In New York State, overriding Mayor Michael Blomberg’s veto, the City Council
has passed a ban which became effective in November 2001. However, ticketed drivers can escape the $ 100
penalty if they can prove that they have bought a hands-free set since they were stopped. In July 2004, New
Jersey became the second state with a ban on hand-held phones. In this case, however, police may charge
violators only after stopping them for another infraction. In European states, the penalty ranges from 30 euros
in Germany to 60 euros in Denmark.
Sources: Guardian (23 March 2002); Agence France Presse (1 December 2003); Miami Herald (8 March 2004);
http://www.cellular news.com/car bans; http://www.nj.com/printer.
to induce the same opinion in its neighbors on a checkerboard lattice. Various rules describe this
persuasion process. For example, if two people adopt the same position, all their neighbors follow
suit. In the course of time, the distribution of opinions fluctuates across the board until a consensus is
reached with all sites sharing the same view. For most of the countries listed in table 2 there is an initial
kernel of people holding opinion X (e.g. that using cell phone while on the wheel is risky) composed
(at the very least) of the employees of safety agencies whose job it is to make risk assessments. In
each country, the technical means by which information can be disseminated are very much the same,
and yet, we have these huge differences in the delays required for passing new legislation. It could
be argued that legislation is more difficult to pass in countries which are more centralized, such as
Britain, France or Japan, because it takes longer for the information to reach the top of the “pyramid”.
However, we observe the opposite: in the United States where such legislation can be passed at
state level, the process took longer (even at the level of individual states) than in countries where the
decision had to be taken at national level. In short, in their present form, consensus formation models
can hardly account for what is observed. There is a missing variable.
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4 Conclusion
The observation that the diffusion of news is affected by socio-economic, political or ideological
factors comes hardly as a surprise. In the present case however, the information is not merely a piece
of news, it is a matter of life and death. One might expect that in such a case the information would be
transmitted as quickly as possible. If macro-factors play a crucial role even in such a case, one must
wonder in which kind of situations “pure” consensus formation models (such as the Sznajd model)
may apply. In order to bridge the gap between theory and observation, great efforts should be devoted
to identifying, documenting and analyzing such situations.
The present example can also shed some light on the phenomenon of speculative bubbles. In 1999-
2000 when the average price earnings ratio of the NASDAQ market reached the level of 200 (i.e. 10
times higher than its long-term average) it should have been obvious to everybody that the market was
deeply out of balance. Yet, many medias claimed that the situation was sustainable. “We are making
history” was the motto at that time. As in the cell phone case, the “rational” opinion was overridden
by a flood of opinions generated by a collective phenomenon of self-delusion.
Currently (mid-2004) we have a similar situation in real estate markets. After the more than 100%
price increase that took place in many large cities (e.g. Boston, London, San Francisco, Sydney) it
should be obvious that over the next five years (real) prices will fall by about the same percentage.
Yet, real estate experts and medias are almost unanimous in claiming that the price decrease will not
exceed 15%. In short, these are examples of what can be called collective self-suggestions2.
One feature shared by all these cases is that huge amounts of money are at stake. For instance,
according to an estimate given by the Wall Street Journal (19 July 2004) for the United States 40%
of the traffic on cellular phones is due to drivers; with a total revenue of US wireless carriers of the
order of $ 90 billions in 2003, the share of drivers is $ 37 billions.
A Appendix: Qualitative evidence about smoke screens
How do medias manage to duck the real issues? Let us for a moment return to the Wall Street Journal
article that we mentioned in section 2. This was a full-page paper and one can therefore wonder
how the authors were able to give a substantial account without ever mentioning the simple and plain
facts reported in table 1. The question is of some interest because the arguments and tricks used as
red herrings and smoke screens are not specific to this paper, but are very much the same in all the
publications that try to sidestep the problem. First, the bias of the papers is reflected in the terms used
by the authors: the word “safety” appears 15 times, whereas the word “accident” appears only once
2Perhaps the diffusion of such fallacies could provide a suitable field of application for “pure” consensus formation
models.
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and the words “fatalities” or “death” do not appear at all. The real challenge of such a paper is to give
the impression that the issue is taken seriously, yet without mentioning hard facts. One trick is to give
the impression that it is a complex problem for which no clear conclusion can be reached and to embed
it into a variety of other issues (“a long list of other potential distractions, such as unruly children and
talkative passengers”). Another artifice is to rely on studies which seem to support the view that there
is no problem: “In the summer of 2003, a study by University of North Carolina researchers appeared
to suggest that cell-phone use by drivers wasn’t a big problem. The AAA [American Automobile
Association] Foundation for Traffic Safety which funded the research, declared cellphones ranked
next to last on a list of common distractions for drivers. The cellular-industry association issued a
news release, and newspapers nationwide reported the study as evidence that cellphones are a minor
distraction.” How can one understand that a study performed by academic researchers lead to results
which are so blatantly at variance with those summarized in table 1. The answer consists in two points
(i) The complete release of the North Carolina study contained reservations stating that the findings
have a number of serious limitations. Yet, these limitations were not reported in the website posting
of the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, nor were they mentioned in the newspaper reports. (ii)
One should recall that the AAA is hardly an impartial player on this matter since its local sections sell
cellphone services (an information which is given in the Wall Street Journal article albeit at the very
end). Finally, the final argument consists in saying that it would be useless to pass new laws limiting
cell-phone use because it would be impossible to enforce them anyway due to budget limitations (see
the Miami Herald March 8, 2004, that argument is cited in many other publications as well).
A testimony of the success of such disinformation campaigns is the fact that, according the the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislation, 31 US states tried to introduce cellphone driving laws in 2003
but none succeeded. With none of the European countries having banned the use of hands-free phones,
the situation is not very different in Europe.
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